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Abstract—In this paper, a novel framework for normative
modeling of the spectrum sensing and sharing problem in
cognitive radios (CRs) as a transferable utility (TU) cooperative
game is proposed. Secondary users (SUs) jointly sense the
spectrum and cooperatively detect the primary user (PU) activity
for identifying and accessing unoccupied spectrum bands. The
games are designed to be balanced and super-additive so that
resource allocation is possible and provides SUs with an incentive
to cooperate and form the grand coalition. The characteristic
function of the game is derived based on the worths of SUs,
calculated according to the amount of work done for the
coalition in terms of reduction in uncertainty about PU activity.
According to her worth in the coalition, each SU gets a pay-
off that is computed using various one-point solutions such as
Shapley value, τ -value and Nucleolus. Depending upon their data
rate requirements for transmission, SUs use the earned pay-off
to bid for idle channels through a socially optimal Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction mechanism. Simulation results
show that, in comparison with other resource allocation models,
the proposed cooperative game-theoretic model provides the best
balance between fairness, cooperation and performance in terms
of data rates achieved by each SU.
Index Terms—Cooperative game theory, cognitive radio, re-
source allocation, spectrum sensing, spectrum sharing, VCG
auction, normative model.
I. INTRODUCTION
Current wireless networks are characterized by static spec-
trum allocation policy, where spectrum is assigned to license
holders on a long term basis. Due to recent increase in
spectrum demand, certain bands face severe scarcity and
yet, a large portion of the spectrum is often under-utilized
across time and space [1]. The apparent scarcity in spectrum
arises from rigid frequency allocations rather than actual
physical shortage of the spectrum. Techniques facilitating
flexible spectrum usage have been developed in order to solve
these inefficiency problems. The key enabling technology of
dynamic spectrum access techniques is cognitive radio (CR)
technology [2], [3], [4], which provides the capability for
unlicensed secondary users (SUs) to opportunistically access
unused licensed bands (spectrum overlay approach) without
causing harmful interference to primary users (PUs).
In a CR network, SUs collaboratively sense the spectrum
[5], [6], based on a sensing policy to identify available portions
of the spectrum referred to as spectrum holes. By exchanging
information about the state of spectrum occupancy in terms of
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local log likelihood ratios (LLRs) and side information such
as signal to noise ratios (SNRs), SUs are able to improve
detection performance and network coverage [7]. After sens-
ing, SUs share the available spectrum amongst themselves and
coordinate transmission attempts in idle channels based on a
access policy. A Fusion Center (FC) manages the coalition’s
sensing and access policy. Since spectrum access is entirely
dependent on sensing results in a CR network, both policies
are closely interlinked and hence, a joint spectrum sensing and
access policy must be modeled to optimize the utilization of
spectral resources. Thus, there is a need to normatively model
the spectrum sensing and sharing problem jointly in CRs to
design, regulate and evaluate the system performance.
Sharing the benefits of cooperative sensing is a non-trivial
problem and is of great interest. In order to arrive at an
access policy that is acceptable to all SUs, the competition and
conflict of interest between the SUs must be resolved in a fair
manner. This calls for a game-theoretic approach to modeling
the problem at hand. For example, if the identification of
unoccupied spectrum bands by the SUs can be construed as
value in a quantitative and/or qualitative sense, the problem
of accessing unoccupied spectrum bands reduces to allocating
this value among the SUs by means of a cooperative game.
A cooperative game [8], [9], focuses on what groups of SUs
(coalitions) can jointly achieve without considering how the
SUs function internally in the coalition. The main assumption
in cooperative games is that the grand coalition of all SUs
within a certain geographical area will form and hence, the
aim of the game is to allocate the overall value created by
the SUs. Thus, modeling the spectrum sensing and sharing
problem in CRs as a cooperative game is both intuitively and
logically appealing.
It is possible that the spectral resources are quite limited
in order to be allocated to all SUs or the SUs themselves
might not need to access the channel immediately but at a
later time after sensing. Hence, it would be useful to have
a transferable utility (TU) where the SUs can translate the
allocations to some form of common currency and depending
upon their data rate requirements for transmission, use the
currency to bid on idle channels. A suitable mechanism is
needed to facilitate the process of coordinating the bids from
SUs and allocating idle channels to them. Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) auction [10], [11], based approach is considered
here in order to demonstrate that a socially optimal and
feasible mechanism exists that can allocate idle channels to
SUs. However, devising an optimal bidding strategy for SUs
is a complex combinatorial problem that entails a separate
study in mechanism design and is beyond the scope of this
2paper.
Non-cooperative game theory has been used to study, de-
sign, model and evaluate the performance of CRs in [12], [13],
[14]. Bargaining solutions to spectrum sharing problem in CRs
have also been studied in the past [15]. A detailed tutorial
on coalitional game theory for communication networks can
be found in [16]. Cooperative game theory has been applied
in higher layers such as network and transportation layers to
study routing protocols [17], [18], to study packet forward-
ing [19], and to study resource allocation [20]. Coalitional
game theory has been used to model cooperation in wireless
networks in [21]. Auctioning has been studied in detail with
respect to spectrum sharing in [22]. The authors are not aware
of any joint modeling of spectrum sensing and sharing in CRs
using game theory or other methods.
In this paper, we propose a framework for joint modeling of
the spectrum sensing and sharing problem in CRs as a coop-
erative game with transferable utility. The worth of individual
players/coalitions in the game is calculated according to the
quality and quantity of work done for the coalition. The result-
ing games have an inherent structure that provides the games
with desirable properties such as balancedness and super-
additivity. Balanced games have non-empty cores which makes
resource allocation possible and stable. Super-additive games
ensure that grand coalition is always formed and that the SUs
have an incentive to cooperate rather than compete with each
other. Since the core could be very large, one-point solutions
such as Shapley value, τ -value and Nucleolus are computed
that provide singleton pay-off allocations. Depending upon
their data rate requirements, SUs bid accordingly on idle
channels with pay-offs obtained from cooperatively sensing
the spectrum. A Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction is used
to allocate resources to SUs to demonstrate that a feasible
mechanism exists that can allocate idle channels to SUs based
on their bids and data rate requirements.
The contributions of this paper are as follows :
• A novel and comprehensive framework for normative
joint modeling of the spectrum sensing and sharing
problem in CRs as a transferable utility (TU) cooperative
game is proposed.
• The characteristic function of the game is derived based
on the worths of each SU calculated according to the
amount of work done by the SU for the coalition.
• The quantity and quality of work done by the SU is
measured in terms of reduction in uncertainty about the
PU that the SU brings from sensing the channels.
• The resulting game is shown to be balanced and super-
additive in nature thereby ensuring that the resource
allocation is possible and that SUs have an incentive to
cooperate.
• Various one-point solutions such as the Shapley value, τ -
value and Nucleolus are computed that provide singleton
pay-offs to the SUs.
• A VCG auction mechanism is considered as an example
to demonstrate that a socially optimal feasible mechanism
exists that can allocate idle channels to SUs based on their
bids and data rate constraints for transmission.
• Examples that illustrate the proof of concept of the
proposed game-theoretical allocation mechanism are pro-
vided.
• The cooperative game-theoretic method is compared
against other common allocation models to show that
the proposed method achieves the best balance between
fairness, cooperation and performance in terms of data
rate achieved by each SU.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The CR
network structure and the model used for spectrum sensing
and sharing in CRs is over viewed in Section II. The proposed
game-theoretic modeling and VCG auctioning is described in
detail in Section IV. In particular, spectrum sensing and sharing
in CRs is normatively modeled as a cooperative game, the
characteristic function of the game is derived, pay-offs to SUs
are computed, the game is characterized and the mechanism
of VCG auction is explained. Simulation examples that show
how the proposed model allocates resources in a fair and stable
manner are illustrated in Section V. The proposed cooperative
game-theoretic model is also compared against other common
allocation models and the performance in terms of data rate
achieved by each SU is analyzed. Section VI concludes the
paper. Analytical results that prove the various properties of
characteristic function of the modeled game such as non-
negativity, monotonicity, balancedness and super-additivity are
provided in the Appendix.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we describe the CR network structure and
the model used for spectrum sensing and sharing in CRs.
CR networks enable efficient spectrum usage for SUs via
dynamic spectrum access techniques and heterogeneous net-
works without causing harmful interference to PUs. Multiple
SUs equipped with CR enabled devices form centralized (CR
base station) or ad-hoc network structures to perform spectrum
management functions such as spectrum sensing, spectrum
decision, spectrum sharing and interference management [23].
The available spectrum may consist of contiguous or scat-
tered frequency bands and is assumed to be subdivided into
M sub-bands. There are one or more PUs operating in these
sub-bands. Without any loss in generality, PU activity can be
assumed to be random as there is no a priori information. If
there is a prior model for PU activity, it can be incorporated
into the game without affecting the system model. There are
N SUs who wish to cooperate and make use of the unused
licensed spectrum. A FC manages the sensing and access
policy of the SUs. In the absence of a dedicated central
entity, one of the SUs can serve as the FC. The FC and
SUs communicate with each other through a common control
channel. SUs sense the channels for PU activity based on
any one of the available sensing methods such as energy
detection, cyclostationary-based detection, matched filter etc.
Decision statistics such as LLRs or other sufficient statistic
combined with side information such as SNRs may be trans-
lated to probability of detecting (Pd) the PU in the channel.
Alternatively, the SUs could send only the LLRs and the FC
can translate them to probability of detecting the PU. Based
on the probabilities of detection of PU activity reported by
3SUs, FC makes a decision about channel availability. The soft
decision statistics reported by the SUs enable the FC to make
a qualitatively better decision about spectrum occupancy.
Once the idle channels have been identified, the worth of
each user and each coalition is calculated by the FC based
on the quantity and quality of work done. For example, the
quantity of work done can be measured by the number of
channels sensed and power spent in sensing them, while the
quality of work can be measured in terms of reduction of
uncertainty about PU activity. The worth of each user/coalition
determines how the overall value created by the grand coalition
is distributed among the SUs. Pay-offs received by each SU
is calculated according to cooperative game-theoretic solution
concepts. With this pay-off, SUs bid for idle channels accord-
ing to their data transmission rate requirements or save the
pay-offs for later use. FC acts as the auctioneer and allocates
idle channels to bidders according to VCG auction mechanism.
Every time slot t consists of a sensing (Sx) minislot fol-
lowed by a transmission (Tx) minislot as shown in Fig. 1.
t sx t tx
Fig. 1. Time slots are divided into sensing and transmission minislots.
Sensing periods are synchronized between SUs and si-
multaneous sensing and transmission in the same channel
is not possible. In order to minimize the number of times
each SU communicates with the FC during every time slot
t, information exchange between them is modeled in the
following manner.
At the end of Sx minislot in t, each SU sends FC the
following information :
• Sensing results in terms of LLRs or probability of detect-
ing PU for the just concluded Sx minislot in t.
• Estimated achievable capacities of the channels sensed in
t (based on instantaneous SINR).
• A sealed bid for accessing idle channels during the
upcoming Tx minislot in t depending upon data rate
requirements of the SU.
• Preference for number of channels to be sensed by the SU
during Sx minislot in t+1, after taking into consideration
various factors such as type of data to be transmitted, data
rate, QoS, power constraints, etc.
At the beginning of Tx minislot in t, FC sends SUs the
following information :
• A Channel allocation map indicating which SU gets to
transmit over which idle channel during Tx minislot in t
based upon the SU bids and estimated channel capacities.
• Normalized pay-offs received by SUs for sensing the
spectrum up until t slots with which SUs bid at the end of
Sx minislot in t+1 for idle channels that will be available
at time interval t+ 1.
• A spectrum sensing allocation map according to which
SUs sense different sub bands of spectrum during the Sx
minislot in t+ 1.
It is also possible that the FC and the SUs could commu-
nicate with each other a few more times in slot t to optimize
the bidding procedure. Instead of bidding based on their own
data rate requirements, the SUs could first obtain information
about the idle channels and then make an informed bid based
on the estimated capacities of the idle channels. For instance, if
the estimated capacities of idle channels are not good enough
for the SU’s data rate requirements, then she can make a
low bid and save her pay-off for future bidding when the
channel conditions are good. In further complex systems, SUs
can learn the bidding strategy of other SUs or model the
data rate requirements of other SUs and make a bid after
adjusting for the newly available information. In addition to
complicating the communication between the SUs and the
FC, these methods consume additional power, create a lot
of overhead on the control channel and encroach upon the
time that the SUs could otherwise have spent in accessing the
idle channels. If the gain is sufficiently high, the additional
power, bandwidth and delay can be justified, but in this paper,
a basic communication model between the SUs and the FC as
described above is considered to avoid complexities.
III. GAME MODELING
In this section, we describe in detail how the characteristic
function of the proposed game is modeled, or in other words,
how the worth of each individual user and coalitions are
calculated at the FC and how their respective pay-offs are
derived. Additionally, we also describe the Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) auctioning procedure in a cooperative game-
theoretic setting to demonstrate that a feasible mechanism
exists to allocate unoccupied bands of the spectrum to cooper-
ating SUs based on their pay-offs and data rate requirements.
Since there is no information or model about PU activity, it
is assumed to be random and is modeled as a binary random
variable. Thus, the average probability of detecting the PU
before sensing the channel without any a priori information is
0.5. The binary entropy function H(Pd) measures the amount
of uncertainty associated with the detection probabilities Pd.
In other words, the uncertainty associated with the PU ac-
tivity before sensing the channel is at its maximum with a
value of H(0.5) = 1. After sensing the channel, SNRs are
translated to probability of detection of the PU occupying
the channel. These detection probabilities, irrespective of the
sensing method used, help to reduce the uncertainty about the
PU activity after sensing the channel.
The key principle involved in calculating the worth of
each SU is based on the reduction in uncertainty about the
PU activity that she brings from sensing the channels. This
reduction in uncertainty is calculated as H(0.5) − H(pij) =
1 − H(pij), where pij is the probability of detection of PU
by SU i on channel j. However, the SU is not rewarded if its
detection probability value is not in agreement with the global
decision taken by the FC about PU activity. Moreover, there
might be other users and coalitions (entities in general) that are
sensing the particular channel and bringing in information to
the FC about PU activity on that channel. Since the FC values
the information from all entities equally, the information
brought in by a SU will be appropriately weighted by the
total number of entities sensing this channel. Thus, the worth
4of the SU i on channel j is given by,
v({i}) =
1−H(pij)
ci(j)
, (1)
where ci(j) is the total number of entities sensing channel j
in addition to SU i. Aggregating the reduction in uncertainty
from all sensed channels, the worth of the SU is given by,
v({i}) =
M∑
j=1
1−H(pij)
ci(j)
, (2)
where M is the total number of channels.
Calculating the worth of a coalition is slightly more cumber-
some. The coalition is treated as if it were a single user. The
detection probability values for the coalition are chosen from
SUs within the coalition in such a way that the best detection
probability among the SUs is selected for the coalition. Since
the coalition is bound by the FC’s decision on spectrum
occupancy, the best detection probability for the coalition
is deemed to be the probability that agrees as closely as
possible with the decision taken by the FC about PU activity,
thereby maximizing the worth of the coalition. The benefits of
cooperation are quite evident in this set-up where the worth
of the coalition is maximized and all SUs of the coalition
benefit by the best performing SU within the coalition who
is proportionally rewarded for her performance. Thus, the
best detection probability value for the coalition is given
by | max
∀i∈S
(pij .Dj) |, where Dj is the spectrum decision on
channel j taken by the FC (+1 when PU is present and -
1 when PU is absent). Due to diversity gains, information
obtained from a coalition is more reliable than the information
obtained from a single SU. In order to account for this, the
total reduction in uncertainty about the PU activity brought in
by the coalition is appropriately weighted by number of SUs
in the coalition.
The general characteristic function is thus given by,
v(S) = |S|
M∑
j=1


1−H
(
|max
∀i∈S
(pij .Dj) |
)
cS(j)

 , (3)
where, S is any coalition in {1, 2, ..., N}, |S| represents the
cardinality of the set S, M is the number of channels, H is
the binary entropy function , pij is the probability of detection
of PU by SU i on channel j, Dj is the spectrum decision (+1
when PU is present and -1 when PU is absent) on channel
j and cS(j) is the total number of entities sensing channel j
including the coalition S.
Games modeled in this fashion are balanced and super-
additive in nature. See Appendix for detailed proof. Bal-
ancedness ensures that the core of the game is non-empty
and hence resource allocation (spectrum sharing) is possible
and stable. Various one-point solutions can be calculated that
provide unique pay-offs, especially the nucleolus, which is
guaranteed to lie in the core as the core is non-empty [24].
Super-additivity ensures that no individual SU or a coalition
of SUs deviates from the grand coalition and that the SUs
prefer to form the grand coalition for cooperatively sensing
and sharing the spectrum. However, from the FC’s point of
view, it might be beneficial if some SUs form a new coalition
due to the prevailing channel conditions or location of PUs,
but addressing these issues is out of scope of this paper. The
absence of an incentive to split away from the grand coalition
reassures the SUs a sense of fairness in the calculation of
pay-offs.
The FC can proportionally allocate idle bands of the spec-
trum in the upcoming Tx minislot based upon the pay-offs
earned by the SUs. However, it is possible that the spectrum
resources are quite limited in order to be distributed to all SUs
or the SUs themselves might not wish to transmit data in the
upcoming Tx minislot. Hence, instead of directly translating
the pay-offs to spectrum resources, it would be advantageous
to have a system where the pay-offs can be transferred to some
form of currency and be used according to the wishes of the
SUs.
In a TU game, the pay-offs obtained from cooperatively
sensing the spectrum are normalized and directly translated
to a currency unit that can be used by the SUs to bid on
idle channels. The SUs use these normalized pay-offs as
currency to bid according to their data rate requirements for
transmission. Thus, SUs with full buffers or an urgent need
to transmit (for e.g., delay intolerant data such as video calls)
will bid almost all of their pay-off to acquire the best possible
channel for transmission, while SUs having a less urgent need
to transmit (for e.g., delay tolerant data such as text messages)
will judiciously bid only a part of their pay-off and reserve rest
of the pay-off to bid when a greater demand to transmit arises
in the future and SUs who do not wish to transmit need not
make a bid at all. Therefore, we consider the VCG auctioning
procedure to prove that a feasible mechanism exists that can
allocate idle channels to SUs based on their pay-offs and data
rate requirements.
The FC acting as the VCG auctioneer arranges bids from
SUs and the highest bidding SU is allocated a channel that
is best for her (in terms of estimated channel capacity) and
is charged a price equal to the second highest bid plus a
bid increment. The bid increment ensures that the winner
of the auction always pays a slightly higher price than the
second highest bidder. This price is now subtracted from
the bid of the SU who was just allocated the channel and
bids from SUs are rearranged to allocate the remaining idle
channels in a similar manner. This procedure continues until
the FC runs out of idle channels to allocate. The balance
pay-offs of SUs after the auction are normalized again and
are averaged with the normalized pay-offs obtained from
sensing the spectrum in the previous time slots. Normalized
averaging of the pay-off ensures that no single SU can collect
a huge amount of pay-off by not bidding for a long time
and then suddenly hog the auction by exploiting all available
spectrum opportunities and denying other SUs a fair chance
of accessing the spectrum. This procedure of cooperatively
sensing the spectrum, earning pay-offs through a transferable
utility cooperative game, bidding on idle channels through a
VCG auction is repeated over all time slots.
From the data rate point of view, by allocating to the highest
bidder the best channel as seen by her at the price of the second
5highest bid, VCG auction maximizes total utilities of SUs and
is hence referred to as a socially optimal mechanism. Also,
VCG auction provides SUs with a weakly dominant strategy
to truthfully bid according to the SU’s actual transmission
requirements. By allocating channels to SUs who value them
most and have worked qualitatively and quantitatively to
achieve a larger pay-off, the resulting game is construed to
be fair by all SUs which provides them with an incentive for
future cooperation.
IV. SIMULATION EXAMPLES
In this section, we provide an example to illustrate the
proposed cooperative game-theoretic approach to jointly mod-
eling the spectrum sensing and accessing scenario in cognitive
radios. A multi-band multi-user scenario is considered. We
show that through the cooperative game-theoretic approach,
a solution exists for the resource allocation problem and that
the allocation is fair, stable, provides SUs with an incentive
to cooperate and is socially optimal. We also compare the
proposed model to other commonly known allocation models
in terms of the rate achieved by each SU and the sum rate of
all SUs to show that the proposed method provides the best
balance between fairness, cooperation and performance.
Simulations were carried out in MATLAB with the help of
TUGlab toolbox [25]. The PU signal used in the simulations
is the OFDM signal which is employed in many wireless com-
munication systems such as 3GPP Long term evolution (LTE),
IEEE 802.11 a/g/n Wireless local area networks (WLAN),
IEEE 802.16 Wireless metropolitan area networks (WMAN),
Digital video broadcasting (DVB) standards DVB-T and DVB-
T2.
Let H0 be the null hypotheses, i.e., an OFDM based PU
is absent and H1 be the alternate hypotheses, i.e., an OFDM
based PU is present. The autocorrelation property of OFDM
systems using cyclic prefix (CP) is used for the detection of
PUs. Let the length of the useful symbol data Td = 32 and the
length of the cyclic prefix Tcp = Td/4 = 8. The SUs employ
a autocorrelation based detector and the detection period is
assumed to be 100 OFDM blocks. Therefore, the number of
samples for the autocorrelation estimate at the SU detector is
100(Td+Tcp) = 4000 Samples. This corresponds to a sensing
time of approximately 0.6 ms for a OFDM system with 7 MHz
VHF TV channel bandwidth. Assuming that the test statistics r
are Gaussian distributed [26] with zero mean and variance σ2
under H0 and Gaussian distributed with mean µ1 and variance
σ2 under H1, for a fixed threshold η, the probability of false
alarm is given by Pfa = P (r > η|H0) = 12erfc
(
η√
2σ
)
, and
the probability of detection is given by Pd = P (r > η|H1) =
1
2erfc
(
η−µ1√
2σ
)
.
SUs employ a decentralized cooperative detection scheme
where soft decision statistics from each SU is combined at
the FC to detect PU activity based on a detection rule. In
this case, assuming the parameters of OFDM based PU as
mentioned earlier, the SUs sense the channel and translate
SNRs to probability of detection Pd of PU using Neyman-
Pearson detection strategy under a fixed probability of false
alarm Pfa = 0.05 as shown in Fig. 2(a). The SNR is defined
as SNR = 10log10 σ
2
x
σ2
n
, where σ2x and σ2n are the variances
of the transmitted signal and noise respectively. The receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) plots for the SU detector for
various SNRs are shown in Fig. 2(b).
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Fig. 2. (a) SNR values are mapped to Probability of detection Pd of PU for
Neyman-Pearson detection under a constant false alarm rate Pfa = 0.05. (b)
ROC plots for different values of SNRs.
A. Proof of Concept
In order to illustrate the proposed cooperative game theo-
retical approach using spectrum sensing and sharing in CRs
as an example, let us consider the situation in which there are
3 SUs sensing 3 channels. SUs choose number of channels
they prefer to sense according to their data rate requirements,
power constraints etc. and the FC creates a spectrum sensing
map accordingly as shown in Table I(a). The x in the table
represent channels sensed by SUs. For channels that are sensed
by SUs, SNR values are generated from a random variable that
is uniformly distributed between -25 dB and -5 dB as shown
in Table I(b).
(a) Sensing Map
Sensing Channels
Map 1 2 3
SU
1 x - -
2 - x x
3 x x -
(b) SNR values
SNR Channels
Matrix 1 2 3
SU
1 -19.5949 - -
2 - -7.2246 -17.0642
3 -8.5656 -17.1763 -
TABLE I
SPECTRUM SENSING MAP CREATED BY FUSION CENTER AND SNR
VALUES OBTAINED BY SECONDARY USERS FROM SENSING THE CHANNEL
The obtained SNR values are translated to probability of
detecting the PU and the SUs send the resulting soft detection
probability values to the FC where they are combined and
the idle channels are determined as shown in Table II. In
this example, a simple OR-based decision rule was used. The
presence of PU is denoted by +1, whereas -1 denotes the
absence of PU.
Pd Channels
Matrix 1 2 3
SU
1 0.0734 0.5 0.5
2 0.5 0.8837 0.0968
3 0.7054 0.0953 0.5
Decision -1 1 -1
TABLE II
DETERMINATION OF IDLE CHANNELS FROM DETECTION PROBABILITY
VALUES BY OR-BASED DECISION RULE.
Reduction in uncertainty about PU activity is used as the
metric to reward SUs for the information that she brings from
sensing the channel. However, it must be noted that this rewa
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Fig. 3. Reward metric calculated in terms of reduction of uncertainty about
PU activity from detection probability values after decision on PU activity is
made. Note that SUs reporting detection probability values that contradict the
decision taken by FC are not rewarded.
is conditioned on the decision about channel availability made
by the FC as shown in Fig. 3.
Using (3), the characteristic function for this game is
calculated to be
v = {v(1), v(2), v(3), v(12), v(13), v(23), v(123)}
= {0.3107, 0.7819, 0, 2.1851, 1.2427, 2.0450, 4.9316}
The characteristic function gives the worth of each SU and
the worth of a SU in all possible coalitions. In this game, it
can be seen that SU #2 has the highest worth v(2) for two
reasons. First, SU #2 sensed channel #3 that was not sensed
by any other user thereby bringing valuable information from
that channel. Secondly, she was responsible for detecting the
PU activity on channel #2. Hence it is justified on the part
of SU #2 to expect the highest pay-off. Even though she has
sensed only one channel, SU #1 has the next highest individual
worth v(1) as her sensing result was in direct agreement with
the decision taken at the FC about PU activity and expects
to get the second highest pay-off. Though SU #3 senses two
channels, her sensing results were not in agreement with the
decision taken at the FC about PU activity and hence ends
up with an individual worth of 0. However, in coalition {23},
SU #3 is the only user sensing channel #1 and in coalition
{13}, SU #3 is the only user sensing channel #2 thereby
bringing valuable information from these channels. Since these
contributions must be valued, it is fair on the part of SU #3 to
expect a non-zero pay-off even though her individual worth in
the game is 0. From the characteristic function, three different
one-point solutions for this game based on Shapley values,
Tau values and Nucleolus are computed and shown in Table
III.
Normalized One-point solutions
pay-offs Shapley values Tau Values Nucleolus
SU
1 30.5526 30.6662 32.2484
2 43.4645 43.3531 41.8029
3 25.9830 25.9807 25.9487
TABLE III
NORMALIZED PAY-OFFS FOR THE MODELED COOPERATIVE GAME BASED
ON VARIOUS ONE-POINT SOLUTIONS.
From the normalized pay-offs shown in Table III, we see
that the pay-offs reflect the expectations of the SUs. As stated
earlier, games modeled in this fashion are balanced and super-
additive in nature implying that a solution (pay-off) exists
and that the SUs have an incentive to cooperate and form
the grand coalition. The differences in the normalized pay-
offs between the three one-point solutions arise by virtue
of definition of these solutions. As a compromise, it is
possible for the SUs to arrive at a single solution through
bargaining, but the minor difference in pay-offs combined with
the computational complexity renders the bargaining approach
unnecessary. Moreover, it is guaranteed that the Nucleolus
always lies in the core of the game ensuring the stability of
the allocation and hence can be used as the default solution.
Working with normalized Nucleolus as pay-offs, SUs bid for
channels based upon their transmission requirements which
is modeled as a Gaussian random walk. The transmission
requirements of the SUs can be quantified in terms of the
size of the outgoing data buffer. Assuming additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel with SNR values drawn from
a uniform distribution between -25 dB and -5 dB, channel
capacity (in Mbps) for a 7 MHz bandwidth is estimated using
Shannon’s capacity formula [27] as shown in Table IV.
Channel Channels SU
Capacity 1 2 3 Bids
SU
1 0.0547 0.0429 0.0974 24.7943
2 0.7187 0.0143 0.4765 6.9917
3 2.0485 0.9998 0.0318 22.3673
TABLE IV
ESTIMATED CHANNEL CAPACITIES ALONG WITH SECONDARY USER BIDS
The VCG auction takes place as follows. From Table IV, SU
#1 has the highest bid and the best channel for her in terms of
achievable data rate is channel #3. She gets access to channel
#3 at the price of the second highest bidder (SU #3) plus one
bid increment totaling 22.3674. This price is deducted from
the bid of SU #1 and the new bid of SU #1 is 2.4269. The
bids are sorted again and the auction is continued. SU #3 is the
highest bidder now and the best channel for her is channel #1.
As SU #2 is the second highest bidder now, SU #3 pays a price
of 6.9918 for channel #3. After the completion of bidding and
allocation, remaining pay-offs of the SUs are normalized and
averaged with the normalized pay-offs obtained from the next
time slot. The allocation procedure is depicted in Table V.
Allocation Secondary Users
table 1 2 3
Norm. Pay-off 32.2484 41.8029 25.9487
Bids 24.7943 6.9917 22.3673
Price Paid 22.3674 - -
Channel Allocated #3 - -
Rate Achieved (in Mbps) 0.0974 - -
Bids 2.4269 6.9917 22.3673
Price Paid - - 6.9918
Channel Allocated - - #1
Rate Achieved (in Mbps) - - 2.0485
Balance Pay-off 9.8810 41.8029 18.9569
Norm. Balance Pay-off 13.9876 59.1767 26.8357
TABLE V
ALLOCATION TABLE SHOWING USER PAY-OFFS AND BIDS AND
SUBSEQUENT CHANNEL ALLOCATIONS BASED ON VCG AUCTION
A few interesting things can be noted here. Though SU
#3 had the lowest pay-off, her need for transmission was
greater than SU #2 as was reflected in her bid and hence,
she still gets access to a channel. It must be noted that the
price paid by a SU for accessing a channel is not based on
the estimated channel capacity, but is totally dependent on the
data rate requirements of other users to access the channel.
This is why SU #1 pays a far higher price for a channel
7with lower estimated capacity compared to SU #3. SU #2
bids conservatively and reserves her pay-off for future use.
At the end of the allocation, we see that SUs #1 and #3
have a very low normalized balance pay-off compared to SU
#2 and will have to work hard in terms of qualitatively and
quantitatively sensing the spectrum to be able to bid competi-
tively in the future. VCG auction does not guarantee data rate
maximization, but allocates resources according to SU bids
and hence satisfies the data rate requirements of the SUs in a
fair manner. Thus, we see that the proposed cooperative game-
theoretic model for jointly modeling the spectrum sensing and
sharing scenario in cognitive radios results in an allocation that
is fair, socially optimal and provides SUs with an incentive to
cooperate in the future.
In the following sections, we compare the performance of
the proposed cooperative game-theoretic model for resource
allocation with other common allocation models in terms of
the data rates achieved by each SU and the sum data rate of
all SUs. We show that the proposed model provides the best
balance between fairness, cooperation and performance among
all the other models considered. Assuming a similar set-up as
described in this section, we carry out simulations over 1000
time slots with 3 SUs sensing 5 channels.
B. Comparison with joint sensing and probabilistic access
model
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Fig. 4. Comparison between CG-JSJA and JSPA models. The box plot
depicts the minimum value, first quartile, median, mean, third quartile and
the maximum value of the achieved data rates for both models for each SU.
The proposed cooperative game-theoretic joint sensing and
joint access (CG-JSJA) model is compared with a joint sensing
and probabilistic access model (JSPA). In JSPA, the SUs
jointly sense the channel and collaboratively detect the PU at
the FC, but access the idle channels in a probabilistic fashion
very similar to carrier sense multiple access (CSMA) protocol.
In order to compare the two models in a fair manner, in JSPA,
the SUs choose the number of channels to access from the
available free channels according to their data rate require-
ments for transmission which is proportional to their bids in
the CG-JSJA model. From the channel capacity estimates that
they have, SUs choose the channels with maximum capacity
for transmission. During the transmit minislot, SUs listen to
the channel and if found idle, transmit their data. In the event
of a collision, the SUs back off for a random amount of time
before retransmitting their data. The data rates achieved by
each SU in both the models are shown as a box plot in Fig.
4. It can be seen that each SU achieves a higher maximum,
mean, median, lower quartile and upper quartile data rate in the
cooperative game-theoretic approach when compared to the
probabilistic access model. The lower performance of the JSPA
model can be attributed to the collisions that occur among the
SUs due to the uncoordinated nature of their transmissions.
This shows that there is need for a joint access mechanism
for the SUs to effectively making use of the idle channels and
increase their individual data rate.
C. Comparison with independent sensing and probabilistic
access model
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Fig. 5. Comparison between CG-JSJA and ISPA models. The box plot
depicts the minimum value, first quartile, median, mean, third quartile and
the maximum value of the achieved data rates for both models for each SU.
The proposed CG-JSJA model is compared with a individual
sensing and probabilistic access model (ISPA). In ISPA, the
SUs sense the channels individually and detect the PU on their
own and access the idle channels in a probabilistic fashion
very similar to CSMA protocol. As in the JSPA model, in
ISPA too, the SUs choose the number of channels to access
from the available free channels according to their data rate
requirements which is proportional to their bids in the CG-
JSJA model. During the transmit minislot, SUs listen to the
channel and if found idle, transmit their data. In the event
of a collision, the SUs back off for a random amount of
time before retransmitting their data. The data rates achieved
by each SU in both the models are shown as a box plot
in Fig. 5. Due to independent sensing on 5 channels, the 3
SUs failed to detect the PU activity 2605 times in 1000 time
slots which could have been avoided by jointly sensing the
channels. The lower performance of the ISPA model is due to
the collisions occurring between the SUs during uncoordinated
channel access, thereby demonstrating the necessity for both
jointly sensing and accessing the channel cooperatively.
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Fig. 6. Comparison between CG-JSJA and JSRR models. The box plot
depicts the minimum value, first quartile, median, mean, third quartile and
the maximum value of the achieved data rates for both models for each SU.
D. Comparison with joint sensing and round robin model
The proposed CG-JSJA model is compared with a joint
sensing and round robin access model (JSRR). In JSRR, the
SUs jointly sense the channel and collaboratively detect the
PU at the FC, but the FC allocates the idle channels in a
round robin fashion. Since SUs take turns to transmit their
data, all SUs get an equal opportunity in terms of accessing
idle channels and there are no collisions between the SUs.
However, in this model, the FC does not take into account
the data rate requirements of the SU or suitability of the
channel for the SU while making the allocation. The data
rates achieved by each SU in both the models are shown as
a box plot in Fig. 6. From the SU’s perspective, the JSRR
model is fair enough to provide the SUs with an incentive
to cooperate, but the socially optimal allocation in CG-JSJA
model consistently achieves higher data rates over the JSRR
model for all SUs.
E. Comparison with joint sensing and rate maximization
model
1 2 3
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
x 107
D
at
a 
ra
te
 a
ch
ie
ve
d 
in
 M
bp
s
Secondary users
CG−JSJA vs JSRM, 3 SUs, 5 Channels
CG−JSJA
JSRM
   *     Mean
Fig. 7. Comparison between CG-JSJA and JSRM models. The box plot
depicts the minimum value, first quartile, median, mean, third quartile and
the maximum value of the achieved data rates for both models for each SU.
The proposed CG-JSJA model is compared with a joint
sensing and rate maximization access model (JSRM). In
JSRM, the SUs jointly sense the channel and collaboratively
detect the PU at the FC, but the FC allocates the idle channels
in a manner that maximizes the overall data rate achieved.
Therefore, an idle channel is allocated to the SU whose
capacity estimate on that channel is the highest. Thus, the sum
data rate is maximized and there are no collisions between
the SUs, but the FC does not take into account the data rate
requirements of the SUs. The data rates achieved by each
SU in both the models are shown as a box plot in Fig. 7.
As expected, the JSRM model consistently outperforms the
proposed CG-JSJA model.
F. Comparison among all allocation models
The cumulative data rates achieved by each SU in all the
models are shown in Fig. 8. It is interesting to note that the
ISPA model performs slightly better than the JSPA model. This
is because, in the ISPA model, when the SUs fail to detect the
PU by themselves, they have more channels to choose from
when randomly accessing the channels. Since the number of
idle channels as perceived by each SU increases due to the
missed detections of the PU, there are fewer collisions amongst
the SUs. However, the increased data rate is achieved at the
cost of interefering with the PU (2605 missed detections of
PU by 3 SUs sensing 5 channels over 1000 time slots) and
if the penalty associated with such missed detections of PUs
is extremely high, the marginal increase in data rate of the
ISPA model is not justified. As intended, the JSRM model
achieves the highest possible data rate. The JSRR model, while
providing SUs with an incentive to cooperate, is not able to
match the data rate achieved by the CG-JSJA model.
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Fig. 8. Comparison between CG-JSJA, JSRM, JSRR, JSPA and ISPA models.
The cumulative data rates achieved by each SU and the cumulative sum data
rate achieved by all SUs is shown for all models.
The extent of fairness of these allocation models can be
studied in terms of the number of channels accessed by each
SU based on the bid that she makes. Fig. 9 shows the scatter
plot for the number of channels allocated to SU #3 for the
9normalized bid made by SU #3 in each time slot over 1000
time slots when the number of detected idle channels is equal
to four for all models.
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Fig. 9. Scatter plot depicting the number of channels allocated versus
normalized bids. The plot shows the number of channels allocated to SU
#3 for every normalized bid made by SU #3 in each time slot over 1000
time slots when the number of detected idle channels is equal to four for
CG-JSJA, JSRM, JSRR and JSPA models. In the CG-JSJA model, the tiered
step-like structure indicates that higher the bid made by the SU, the higher
the probability of being allocated more channels. Since bids are made by SUs
from pay-offs earned from sensing the channel, the amount of work done by
SUs and their data rate requirements are fairly reflected in the number of
channels allocated in CG-JSJA model. In comparison, other models are not
construed by the SUs as fair due the fact that the number of channels allocated
to them is independent of the bids made by them.
In the CG-JSJA model, it can be seen that the number
of channels allocated is directly dependent on the bid made
by the SU. The higher the bid made by the SU, the higher
the probability of being allocated more channels. The SUs
make their bids based on their data rate requirements for
transmission and hence, the number of channels allocated to
a SU is directly proportional to its data rate requirements for
transmission. It must be noted here that the SUs cannot make
high bids for the sake of being allocated more channels as
the bids are based on the pay-offs they earn from sensing the
channel. The only way for SUs to make high bids is through
earning better pay-offs in terms of the quality and quantity of
work done in sensing the channels. Thus, the CG-JSJA model
is construed by the SUs to be a very fair model as both the
data rate requirements of the SU and the amount of work done
by the SU is reflected in the resource allocation without any
room for manipulation by the SUs.
For the JSRM model, it can be seen that the SU is allocated
all the idle channels even with a very low bid while at another
time slot, the SU is not allocated any channels even with
a very high bid. The goal in JSRM model is to maximize
the data rate and hence, the number of channels allocated
to a SU is completely dependent on the channel conditions
and independent of the bids made by the SU. Since the
bids made by the SUs based on their data rate requirements
for transmission are not taken into account while allocating
channels, the JSRM model is not construed as a fair model by
the SUs. The higher data rate achieved by the JSRM over
the proposed CG-JSJA model is thus obtained at the cost
of fairness. Similarly, in the JSRR model too, the data rate
requirements of the SUs are not taken into account and it
can be seen that even for very high bids, no SU gets ac-
cess to more than ⌈number of idle channels/number of SUs⌉
channels. However, the SUs are given an equal opportunity
to access the channels in a round robin fashion which can be
construed as somewhat fair despite the lack of consideration
of the bids made by the SUs. In the JSPA or ISPA model,
there is no allocation per se, as the channels are accessed in a
probabilistic fashion and it can be seen that no SU is able to
access all the idle channels due to the collisions arising from
uncoordinated channel access.
The comparisons between various allocation models are
summarized in Table VI.
Thus, the proposed cooperative game-theoretic joint sensing
and joint access model provides the best balance between
fairness, cooperation and performance in terms of data rates
achieved by each SU as well as the sum data rate achieved by
all SUs.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel and comprehensive
framework for normatively modeling spectrum sensing and
sharing problem in cognitive radios as a transferable utility
(TU) cooperative game. Additionally, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) auction is used to demonstrate the existence of a
feasible mechanism to allocate resources to secondary users
(SUs). The characteristic function of the cooperative game
is derived based on the worths of SUs, which is calculated
according to the amount of work done for the coalition in terms
of qualitatively and quantitatively obtaining information about
the probability of detecting the primary user (PU). Games
modeled in this fashion have desirable properties such as
balancedness and super-additivity ensuring that the resource
allocation is possible and providing SUs with an incentive to
cooperate. Various one-point solutions such as Shapley value,
τ -value and Nucleolus are used to compute singleton pay-offs
to the SUs, especially the Nucleolus, which lies within the
core. SUs use these pay-offs to bid for idle channels based
on their data rate constraints for transmission and estimated
channel capacities. VCG auction provides SUs with a dom-
inant strategy to truthfully bid their values, maximizes total
utility of the SUs and allocates resources to bidders who value
them the most, thereby resulting in a socially optimal alloca-
tion. In comparison to other allocation models, the proposed
cooperative game-theoretic model provides a attractive trade-
off among design goals in fairness, stability, cooperation and
achievable data rates. Thus, spectrum resources are allocated
in a fair and stable manner, ensuring that SUs have a very
strong incentive in the future to cooperatively sense and share
unoccupied bands of the spectrum without compromising on
the data rates achieved by the SUs.
APPENDIX
The characteristic function of the proposed cooperative
game (N, v) is given by (3). In the following sections, we pro-
vide proofs for various desirable properties of the characteristic
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Table CG-JSJA JSPA ISPA JSRR JSRM
Properties
Fairness Very High Low Low High Low
Cooperation Very High Moderate Low High High
Achieved Rate High Low Low Moderate Very High
TABLE VI
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE PROPOSED COOPERATIVE GAME-THEORETIC MODEL AND OTHER ALLOCATION MODELS. THE PROPOSED CG-JSJA MODEL
PROVIDES THE BEST BALANCE BETWEEN FAIRNESS, COOPERATION AND PERFORMANCE IN TERMS OF DATA RATES ACHIEVED BY EACH SU AS WELL AS
THE SUM DATA RATE ACHIEVED BY ALL SUS.
function such as Non-negativity, Monotonicity, Balancedness
and Super-additivity.
A. Non-negativity
For each non-empty S ∈ N, v(S) ≥ 0.
Since pij is the probability of detection of PU by SU i
on channel j, 0 ≤ pij ≤ 1. Also, dj = ±1. Therefore, 0 ≤
|max
∀i∈S
(pij .dj) | ≤ 1. Since H is the binary entropy function,
we have 0 ≤ H
(
|max
∀i∈S
(pij .dj) |
)
≤ 1, which also implies
that 0 ≤ 1 −H
(
|max
∀i∈S
(pij .dj) |
)
≤ 1. Also, cS(j) > 0 and
|S| > 0. Thus, we have,
|S|
M∑
j=1
(
(1−H(|max
∀i∈S
(pij .dj) |))/cS(j)
)
≥ 0. (4)
Hence, v(S) ≥ 0.
B. Monotonicity
For all non-empty S,T ∈ N with S ⊂ T, v(S) ≤ v(T).
Let dj = +1. Since the PU is present in the channel, only
SUs with pij ≥ 0.5 are rewarded. Therefore, |max∀i∈S (pij .dj) | ≤
|max
∀i∈T
(pij .dj) |. For pij ≥ 0.5, H
(
|max
∀i∈S
(pij .dj) |
)
≥
H
(
|max
∀i∈T
(pij .dj) |
)
. Let dj = −1. Since the PU is absent
in the channel, only SUs with pij ≤ 0.5 are rewarded.
Therefore, |max
∀i∈S
(pij .dj) | ≥ |max∀i∈T
(pij .dj) |. For pij ≤ 0.5,
H
(
|max
∀i∈S
(pij .dj) |
)
≥ H
(
|max
∀i∈T
(pij .dj) |
)
. Thus, in both
cases, 1 −H
(
|max
∀i∈S
(pij .dj) |
)
≤ 1 −H
(
|max
∀i∈T
(pij .dj) |
)
.
Also, cS ≥ cT for all S ⊂ T . Since |S| < |T |, we have,
|S|
M∑
j=1
(
(1 −H(|max
∀i∈S
(pij .dj) |))/cS(j)
)
≤
|T |
M∑
j=1
(
(1−H(|max
∀i∈T
(pij .dj) |))/cT (j)
)
. (5)
Hence, v(S) ≤ v(T ).
C. Balancedness
For each non-empty S ∈ N,
∑
S
λSv(S) ≤ v(N)
for every balanced collection of weights λS.
Let RS be the S dimensional Euclidean space in which the
dimensions are indexed by the members of S. The character-
istic vector 1S ∈ RN of the coalition S is given by
(1S)i =
{
1 if i ∈ S
0 otherwise. (6)
A collection (λS) of numbers in [0, 1] is a balanced collec-
tion of weights, if for every player i, the sum of λS over all
the coalitions that contain i is 1, such that
∑
S λS1S = 1N .
Since S ⊆ N , we have
M∑
j=1
(
(1 −H(|max
∀i∈S
(pij .dj) |))/cS(j)
)
≤
M∑
j=1
(
(1−H(|max
∀i∈N
(pij .dj) |))/cN (j)
)
. (7)
Therefore, 1|S|v(S) ≤
1
|N |v(N), implying v(S) ≤
|S|
|N |v(N).
Multiplying both sides by λS and summing over all possible
coalitions, we have,
∑
S λSv(S) ≤
v(N)
|N |
∑
S λS |S|. Since the
weights are balanced, v(N)|N |
∑
S λS |S| =
v(N)
|N | |N | = v(N).
Hence,
∑
S λSv(S) ≤ v(N).
D. Super-additivity
For all non-empty S,T ∈ N with S ∩T = φ,
v(S ∪T) ≥ v(S) + v(T).
Since S ⊂ S∪T , from the monotonicity property, we have,
M∑
j=1
(
(1−H(| max
∀i∈S∪T
(pij .dj) |))/cS∪T (j)
)
≥
M∑
j=1
(
(1−H(|max
∀i∈S
(pij .dj) |))/cS(j)
)
. (8)
Similarly, since T ⊂ S∪T , from the monotonicity property,
we have,
M∑
j=1
(
(1−H(| max
∀i∈S∪T
(pij .dj) |))/cS∪T (j)
)
≥
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M∑
j=1
(
(1−H(|max
∀i∈T
(pij .dj) |))/cT (j)
)
. (9)
Multiplying (8) by |S| and (9) by |T | and adding together,
we have,
|S|
M∑
j=1
(
(1 −H(| max
∀i∈S∪T
(pij .dj) |))/cS∪T (j)
)
+
|T |
M∑
j=1
(
(1−H(| max
∀i∈S∪T
(pij .dj) |))/cS∪T (j)
)
≥
|S|
M∑
j=1
(
(1−H(|max
∀i∈S
(pij .dj) |))/cS(j)
)
+
|T |
M∑
j=1
(
(1−H(|max
∀i∈T
(pij .dj) |))/cT (j)
)
. (10)
Thus,
|S ∪ T |
M∑
j=1
(
(1−H(| max
∀i∈S∪T
(pij .dj) |))/cS∪T (j)
)
≥
|S|
M∑
j=1
(
(1−H(|max
∀i∈S
(pij .dj) |))/cS(j)
)
+
|T |
M∑
j=1
(
(1−H(|max
∀i∈T
(pij .dj) |))/cT (j)
)
. (11)
Hence, v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ).
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